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Whose Best Interest? International Child Abduction Under the
Hague Convention
Marisa Leto*

I. INTRODUCTION

Each year 350,000 cases of child abduction occur in the United States.
Approximately 10,000 of these cases involve the abduction of children to foreign
nations by a parent.' A swell in divorce rates and ease of international travel are likely
factors for this recent phenomenon. The primary legal remedy for parents of children
abducted to foreign nations is the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction ("Hague Convention") ratified by the United States
on October 25, 1980.2 As of July
2001, the treaty was in force between the US and
3
fifty other national signatories.
The Hague Convention is designed to return children to their "habitual
residence" where a court of proper jurisdiction will determine custody. The treaty,
however, has been largely ineffective in accomplishing this objective. It has failed to
meet its goal in large part because of reliance on an essentially subjective best interest
standard that facilitates foreign nations' manipulation of the treaty and their wrongful
retention of foreign children within their borders. The subjectiveness of the best
interest standard enables judges to make discretionary decisions. Discretion often
takes the form of gender biases, national biases, and judgments regarding the
itacclimatization" of children to their environment that is often due to judicial delay.
The result is substantive non-compliance with the Hague Convention.
Family courts in the US employ the best interest standard on a daily basis.
Fundamentally subjective and ill-defined, the best interest standard is at best
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inconsistently applied by US courts. However, the complications associated with
implementing this imprecise standard are magnified at the international level. The
development of objective criteria and an international communication network among
judges could facilitate the return of children to the proper jurisdiction and custodial
parent. Efforts to effect reform in these areas have been made, but thus far none have
remedied the problem of non-compliance. Ultimately, the optimal solution may be to
remove the loose language from the treaty that facilitates use of a best interest
standard and replace it with objective criteria that international courts could
consistently apply.
II. THE HAGUE CONVENTION
The Hague Convention is a multilateral treaty, seeking "to protect children
internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to
establish procedures to ensure their prompt return." Despite having ratified the
treaty, many nations still do not satisfactorily comply with the procedure established
for the return of children.
The return rate of abducted children varies from country to country. While the
US returns approximately 90 percent of the children in Hague cases brought in US
courts,' Germanys rate of return is particularly low, at about 39 percent.6 The failure
of this treaty is not due to an international conspiracy to retain American children but
rather lies in the implementation of a best interest standard at the international
judicial level. The US has faced similar problems in its own family courts, where
application of the standard is inconsistent across jurisdictions. Although the best
interest standard has been adopted by many US states through legislation, it has
largely been implemented according to the discretion of judges, who may rely on as
many as ten major factors and forty-three sub-factors in their decisions.
Although developing a set of objective criteria and a strong international
communication network among judges might promote greater uniformity in
implementation of the treaty, the continued low return rate from the same noncompliant nations raises important issues. Either the efforts at consistency must
become more vigilant, or, more likely, the treaty language that facilitates use of a best
interest standard should be removed altogether from the treaty to close the loophole
that, in effect, supports substantive non-compliance through judicial discretion.
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Nations that currently capitalize on the treaty's loophole would likely consent to the
change in order to deter the potential non-compliance of other nations at their
expense. Change is required to safeguard against widespread non-compliance that
could lead to the demise of the treaty.
III. PROCEDURE

Courts essentially have applied a two-pronged procedure to ascertain the
jurisdiction in which the custody determination should be made.
First, the courts consider whether removal of the child by the parent constitutes
a wrongful removal. Removal qualifies as wrongfitl if it breaches the custody rights of
a person or institution under the law of the State where the child was habitually
resident prior to removal and if those rights were exercised or would have been
exercised but for removal.8 The treaty fails to define the term "habitually resident" in
order to allow a fact-specific inquiry to determine the proper jurisdiction for the
custody hearing. Thus, courts look to certain factors relevant to the determination of
habitual residence. These factors focus on a chld's experience, such as his or her
schooling.9
Second, the courts determine whether returning the child would pose "a grave
risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or
otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation."10 Forum courts have frequently
invoked this article to liberally apply a subjective best interest standard.
IV.

REFORM EFFORTS

On October 19, 1996, delegates of the thirty-five Member States of the Hague
Conference drafted the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law,
Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility
and Measures for the Protection of Children, as an international effort to reform the
system in place. The drafters included an explicit best interest standard in the treaty
language that presumably could not remedy the problems associated with the Hague
Convention." An explanatory note indicates that "the intervention of public policy
should take into account the best interests of the child, which principle moreover
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should inspire the application of all the articles of the Convention."' 2 However,
whether implicit or explicit, the best interest standard is highly problematic at the
international level. To date, three nations have ratified this Convention."
Four special commissions have been launched by the Permanent Bureau of the
Hague Convention to review the operation of the treaty in member nations. 4 Most of
the signatories to the treaty attended the recent meeting of the commission in March
2001.15 Representatives advocated increased judicial communication and training and
encouraged the publication of a practice guide for judges who deal with Hague cases.16
The US State Department has facilitated communication through international
conferences in which judges discuss current judicial practices under the Hague
Convention and propose reforms for the judicial systems currently in place. 7 "Such
conferences are important events in emphasizing mutual understanding, respect and
trust between the judges from different countries-factors which are essential to the
effective operation of international instruments concerned with the protection of
children, and in particular, the Hague Child Abduction Convention." 8 However,
only six nations participated in the September 2000 conference. 9 The Permanent
Bureau has also led three judicial seminars, in part to facilitate consistent judicial
practices across jurisdictions, but judges from only seven member jurisdictions
attended the most recent seminar in October 2001. 20
The International Child Abduction Database ("INCADAT") was established
on May 9, 2000 to post recent Hague decisions on the Internet.2' This site was
created by the Permanent Bureau to inform judges and others involved in Hague cases
about the current state of Hague Convention case law in order to promote greater
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Hague Conference, ExplanatoryReport on Convention No. 34, art 22, available online at
<http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/exp134e.html> (visited Mar 24,2002).
Hague Conference, Status Sheet Convention #34,available online at
<http://www.hcch.net/e/status/proshte.html> (visited Mar 24, 2002) (Monaco, the Czech
Republic, and Slovakia have ratified the Convention).
See International Center for Missing and Exploited Children, International Child Abduction, available
online at <http://www.icmec.net/home.htmabduc.htm-mainFrame> (visited Mar 24, 2002).
Id.
Id.
Hague Child Abduction Convention, Judicial Seminars on the International Protection of Cbildren,
Common Law Judicial Conference on International Parental Cbild Abduction, available online at
<ftp://hcch.net/doc/dc.e.doc> (visited Mar 24, 2002).
The Common Law Judicial Conference on International Child Custody, Best Practices, available
online at <http://travel.state.gov/best-practices.html> (visited Mar 24, 2002).
Id.
Hague Convention, Judicial Seminars on the International Protection of Cbildren (cited in note 17)
(Representatives from the jurisdictions of England and Wales, France, Germany, Netherlands,
Scotland, Sweden, and the United States attended this seminar).
Hague Convention on Private International Law, News and Events, available online at
<http://www.hcch.ner/e/events/events.html> (visited Mar 24, 2002).
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consistency in court rulings.' However, this attempt at reform has been insufficient
thus far because not all nations have contributed information to this database.'
These unsuccessful attempts to attain consistency across jurisdictions indicate
that closing the best interest standard loophole may be the only effective method by
which to remedy substantial non-compliance.
Although facilitating judicial
communication and formulating clear standards of application help cure ignorance of
the law, these remedies cannot combat wilifil non-compliance. This is true in large
part because only explicit treaty provisions are binding on member nations; judicial
precedents and how-to guides are merely instructive and therefore can be ignored
altogether.
V. THE PROBLEMS WITH BEST INTEREST
The loopholes in the treaty's language give judges great freedom in enforcement.
There are several possible explanations for low return rates other than poor law
enforcement, namely, acclimatization of children due to judicial delays, and gender
and national biases.
A. CHILD'S NEW HOME
In nations where courts delay proceedings and are particularly slow to hear
Hague Convention cases, judges may use their discretion to retain children in a
foreign jurisdiction. Judges, applying a best interest standard, may find that children
have become attached to their new environment and should, as a result, remain there
for the duration of the custodial hearings. For example, the courts in Austria, a nation
notorious for non-compliance with the Hague Convention, have found that delays in
a case have caused a child to become settled in Austria, such that a forced return to
the US would cause the child psychological damage." Despite reforms in the German
court system, including the implementation of special training for judges handling
cases under the treaty and the designation of specific courts to handle these cases in
larger districts to expedite the process,- the German return rate remains low. Little
empirical data exists showing the effects of these recent reforms on the German return
rate, but US Senate records indicate that Germany has made essentially no progress
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International Child Abduction Database, Introduction,available online at
<http://212.206.44.26/intronew.cfin.id=l&srrtrow=1> (visited Mar 24, 2002).
See International Child Abduction Database, INCADAT Correspondents,available online at
<http://212.206.44.26/start.cfrn.id=15> (visited Mar 24,2002).
Bureau of Consular Affairs, Report on Compliance witb the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of

International Child Abduction, available online at
<http://travelstare.gov/2001-Hague_.Compiance.Report.html> (visited Mar 24, 2002).
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Editorial, ProtectingAmerica's Children, Wash Times A16 (July 3, 2001).
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on open cases.6 The centralization of venue may facilitate more consistent application
of treaty standards. However, consistently biased decisions may continue to be
rendered.
B.

GENDER BIAS

The legal costs incurred by petitioning parents in Hague Convention cases can
be extremely high.' Women, in many countries, receive significantly lower wages
than men. The odds of obtaining custody of their children may be stacked against
mothers in many countries as a result of the inability to afford the litigation.
Although the treaty was intended to deal with the problem of non-custodial
fathers' abduction of their children, mothers are now responsible for about 70 percent
of abductions. Swedish courts notoriously favor Swedish non-custodial mothers over
non-Swedish custodial fathers living outside of Sweden.2 Here, the gender bias may
be compounded by national bias.
After a large increase in the number of female abductors, the UK and Australia
began to apply "undertakings" in Hague cases. Undertakings, or conditions for return,
inherently discriminate against the male petitioning parent.29 Some courts have forced
fathers to pay for the airfare of the female abductor returning the child, finance the
abductor's legal fees, and even drop criminal charges."
One particularly striking situation of gender bias is the Hague Convention case
of O'Donobue v O'Donobue, in which a mother abducted and the father re-abducted
their children." Although the UK refused to hear the case, it imprisoned the father
while he awaited extradition to Sweden, and not only paid for the mothers travel
expenses, but returned the children to her while the case was pending. In the case of
Lebeau v Lebeau, UK officials never even detained a mother awaiting extradition to the
US, though her behavior was far more egregious than that of the father in O'Donobue 2
C. NATIONAL BIAS
National bias may also motivate a judge's decision regarding a child's best
interest. Among signatories to the Hague Convention, Sweden is among the least
compliant.33 Swedish courts favor mothers to fathers and Swedes to non-Swedes
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

147 Cong Rec S 2831 (Mar 23, 2001) (statement of Sen. DeWine).
See Eric Alan Barton, A World Apart: Mom Says Husband Took Girls to S. America, Sarasota Herald
Trib BM1 (Aug 20, 2001).
Johnson, 33 NYUJ L Intl L & Polit at 133 (cited in note 5).
Id at 169.
Idat 170.
Id at 170-71.
See id at 171.
See id at 133.
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through employment of the subjective best interest standard. Germany has also been
accused of favoring the custody applications of its own citizens.' The best interest
standard allows biases to impede the rightful return of children."
VI. CONCLUSION

Differences in culture and difficulty divorcing national pride from judicial
decisions complicate the application of a best interest standard, beyond the difficulties
admittedly experienced in US courts. Unfortunately, international child abduction
cases will not disappear; as divorce rates rise, so too do custody and kidnapping issues.
The low rate of return of children unlawfully taken to or detained in a foreign country
must therefore be addressed. Beyond piecemeal procedural reforms, significant
changes must be made in the treaty's language to ensure progress in this area.
Reforms thus far have been aimed at defining standards more clearly and increasing
judicial awareness of acceptable procedures to be undertaken in Hague cases.
However, little has been done to address the more active non-compliance among
nations that apply the best interest standard in a biased fashion. Loose treaty
language must either be wholly removed or more clearly defined within the treaty
itself, with the establishment of more extensive international judicial networks to
safeguard custody rights in international disputes. Otherwise, judicial decisions will
continue to be motivated by gender and national biases and affected by judicial delays.
It does not appear that there are any serious proposals to remove this
problematic language from the treaty. In fact, the 1996 Convention seems to indicate
that the international effort at reform may be heading in the wrong direction.
Attempts to devise clear language to be applied by all judges in Hague Convention
cases have been made, in the form of seminars and commissions attended by judges
from the various national delegations. However, the treaty still does not possess an
objective best interest standard, a standard that would be in the best interest of the
children involved.

34.
35.

See Bureau of Consular Affairs, Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
InternationalCbild Abduction (cited in note 24).
Interestingly, the recent case of Elian Gonzalez illustrates how the US court system, even where the
Hague Convention is not implicated, is apparently able to divorce itself from a national bias to
consider the best interest of the child and return him to his legal guardian.
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